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Abstract: 
Over the past decade, rising youth use of e-cigarettes and other electronic nicotine delivery 
systems (ENDS) has prompted aggressive regulation by state and local governments. Between 
2010 and 2019, ten states and two large counties adopted ENDS taxes. Applying a continuous 
treatment difference-in-differences approach to data from two large national datasets 
(Monitoring the Future and the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System), this study explores 
the impact of ENDS taxes on youth tobacco use. We find that ENDS taxes reduce youth e-
cigarette consumption, with estimated e-cigarette tax elasticities of -0.06 to -0.21. However, we 
estimate sizable positive cigarette cross-tax elasticities, suggesting economic substitution 
between cigarettes and e-cigarettes for youth. These substitution effects are particularly large for 
frequent cigarette smoking. We conclude that the unintended effects of ENDS taxation may more 
than fully offset any public health gains. 
Keywords: Electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS), e-cigarettes, vaping, cigarettes, 
smoking, taxes, youth. 
JEL codes: H2; I1; I18 
Acknowledgements and notes: Author order is alphabetic and lead authorship is shared 
amongst all the authors. Research reported in this publication was supported by the National 
Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health under award number R01DA045016 
(PI: Michael Pesko), R01DA039968 (PI: Dhaval Dave), and an Evidence for Action grant from 
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (grant #74869; PI: Friedman). Dr. Sabia acknowledges 
support from San Diego State University’s Center for Health Economics & Policy Studies 
(CHEPS), Dr. Courtemanche acknowledges support from the University of Kentucky’s Institute 
for the Study of Free Enterprise, and Dr. Abouk acknowledges support from William Paterson 
University’s Cannabis Research Institute. 
1 
1. Introduction
In 2009, public health officials in the United States established Healthy People 2020 
goals, one of which was to reduce the youth smoking rate from 19.5% to 16.0% by 2019 
(HealthyPeople.gov 2020). In the introduction to a 2012 Surgeon General report on smoking, 
Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius warned that “youth and 
adult smoking rates that had been dropping for many years have stalled” (US Department of 
Health Human Services 2012). This situation quickly changed, however, as youth smoking rates 
fell to 6.0% by 2019, thus surpassing the Healthy People 2020 objective by 386%. What caused 
such an unanticipated decline in youth cigarette smoking?1 One candidate is the introduction of 
electronic cigarettes and other electronic nicotine delivery systems (‘ENDS’). ENDS were first 
imported into the US in August 2006 (CASAA 2020), and overtook cigarettes as the most 
commonly used tobacco product among youth in 2014 (Pesko and Warman 2021). In 2019, 
32.9% of youth used an ENDS over the past 30 days, while 10.7% used ENDS frequently; that 
is, on 20 or more of the past 30 days (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2020). 
On the whole, the current scientific consensus is that ENDS are likely substantially less 
dangerous than combustible tobacco products (e.g., cigarettes), which are estimated to kill 
480,000 Americans annually (United States Surgeon General 2014). However, the exact relative 
risks remain uncertain. Based on data from an August 2020 survey of 137 tobacco scholars, the 
mean (median) tobacco expert believed that the effect of vaping ENDS on quality-adjusted life 
expectancy was 37% (25%) as large as the effect of smoking (Allcott and Rafkin 2021). 
Accounting for harms to others as well as the user, a 2013 expert panel concluded that ENDS 
were unlikely to exceed 5% of the harm of cigarettes (Nutt et al. 2014), a statistic cited in 
subsequent reviews of evidence on ENDS’ effects sponsored by Public Health England (McNeill 
et al. 2018). While the US debate does not use a specific estimate for these products’ relative 
risks, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s 2018 report concluded 
that “e-cigarettes appear to pose less risk to an individual than combustible tobacco cigarettes” 
1 Some data sources, such as the National Youth Tobacco Survey, show an acceleration in youth cigarette use 
reductions starting in 2012 (Meza, Jimenez-Mendoza, and Levy 2020), but this acceleration is not obvious in other 
data sources. However, assuming that demand curves are convex in the left and/or straighter or concave in the 
middle, cigarette regulation would yield less impact in terms of reducing smoking from lower levels of use than 
higher levels of use. Therefore, the continuation of smoking reductions even through low levels of youth cigarette 
use as we have seen recently could suggest e-cigarette introduction had an impact larger than is immediately obvious 
from observing raw consistent trends in youth smoking declines. 
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and “e-cigarette aerosol contains fewer numbers and lower levels of toxicants than smoke from 
combustible tobacco cigarettes.” Health costs may be higher, however, for informally sourced e-
cigarette products (e.g., related to unknown additives) than mainstream commercial e-cigarettes. 
ENDS may affect youth health differently than adult health. One commonly cited reason 
is the potential deleterious effects of nicotine on youth brain development. However, as this 
evidence is based mostly on studies of rodents (United States Surgeon General 2016), the 
relationship’s generalizability to humans is unclear (Balfour et al. 2021). Similarly, the 
magnitude of the danger posed by nicotine compared to other substances like alcohol, 
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), caffeine, and sugar on adolescent brain development is also 
unclear.  
Another commonly-voiced concern is the 2016 Surgeon General report’s conclusion that 
“e-cigarette use is strongly associated with combustible tobacco product use” (United States 
Surgeon General 2016). However, the idea that this association reflects a causal effect of e-
cigarette use on subsequent smoking is inconsistent with the typical directionality of uptake over 
time—daily smoking is more common among young adults who tried cigarettes before e-
cigarettes (Friedman, Buckell, and Sindelar 2019; Etter 2018). This stated association also fails 
to accurately forecast rapidly declining youth cigarette use. Despite limited causal evidence that 
ENDS access negatively impacts youth health, the Surgeon General has declared high rates of 
youth ENDS use to be an epidemic (United States Surgeon General 2018). 
Policies designed to reduce access to ENDS therefore appear to prioritize the goal of 
reducing nicotine exposure over the goal of harm reduction. Such regulations have been 
increasing over time, beginning with ENDS minimum legal sales ages of 18 or higher 
implemented in all states between 2010 and 2016. As of March 2021, 30 states had adopted 
ENDS taxes (Public Health Law Center 2021) while 23 had added ENDS to their existing indoor 
smoking laws (American Non-Smokers Rights Foundation 2021).  
Further, the future of ENDS sales in the US is uncertain. To authorize marketing for 
individual ENDS products, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) must determine that these 
products are appropriate for public health. While the FDA reviews millions of premarket tobacco 
product applications, it is currently allowing the sale of ENDS through enforcement discretion. 
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But some localities are unwilling to wait out this review process: as of June 2020, 33 cities and 
three American Indian reservations had banned the sale of all ENDS (Truth Initiative 2020).  
Despite significant interest in the effect of regulation on youth ENDS use in particular,  
studies have not yet estimated the effect of differential ENDS taxes on youth ENDS and 
combustible tobacco product use. We explore this question using two nationally representative 
datasets: Monitoring the Future (MTF) and the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System 
(YRBSS). Specifically, we use a continuous treatment difference-in-differences research design 
to estimate the relationship between ENDS taxes and a variety of outcomes, including ENDS 
use, combustible tobacco product use, sources of ENDS products (e.g., online purchasing, brick-
and-mortar retailers, informal sources), and perceived risk of ENDS use.  
By documenting both intended and unintended effects of ENDS taxation on youths, this 
study’s findings inform optimal ENDS tax policy. In particular, our results speak directly to the 
question of whether ENDS accessibility reduces youth combustible tobacco use. If this indirect 
effect on youth tobacco use is positive and large, and the direct harms of ENDS use are small, 
then imposing large taxes on ENDS products could worsen public health on net.  
 
2. Background and related literature 
2.1 ENDS taxation literature 
There is a nascent but growing economic literature studying the effect of ENDS taxes on 
vaping and smoking outcomes. Broadly, the available literature suggests that ENDS and 
cigarettes are economic substitutes,2 although the magnitude of this relationship may vary across 
populations. This finding of substitution is consistent with literature finding minimum legal sales 
ages for ENDS reduce youth ENDS use (Nguyen 2020; Dave, Feng, and Pesko 2019; Abouk and 
Adams 2017) and increase youth smoking (Friedman 2015; Pesko et al. 2016; Pesko and Currie 
2019; Dave, Feng, and Pesko 2019). A substitution relationship between cigarettes and ENDS is 
concerning for policymakers as, if true, restricting access to one good may increase demand for 
 
2 One key exception is that Abouk and Adams (2017) find that minimum legal sales ages for ENDS reduces 
cigarette use among senior high school students, suggesting a complementary relationship between ENDS and 
cigarettes for this particular population group. 
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the other. Below, we review existing studies on ENDS taxes and tobacco use, and highlight our 
contributions to this literature. This section also provides evidence that ENDS accessibility, 
proxied by the price of the product, has a public health benefit in reducing combustible tobacco 
use. 
 
Overall population: Using Nielsen Retail Scanner Data (NRSD) from 2011 to 2017, Cotti et al. 
(2021) show that a $1.00 increase in the ENDS tax reduces ENDS sales by 29% and increases 
cigarette sales by 10%. Instrumenting prices with taxes, the authors also calculate an ENDS own-
price elasticity of -1.3 and positive cross-price elasticities of demand between ENDS and 
cigarettes, indicating economic substitution. Allcott and Rafkin (2021) also use Nielsen data 
within the context of a broader shift-share paper, finding some evidence of substitution 
depending on whether time trends are included in the regression model or not. 
 
Adults: Pesko, Courtemanche, and Maclean (2020) use 2011-2018 data from the Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance Survey and the National Health Interview Survey to study the effects of 
ENDS and cigarette taxes on adult vaping and smoking. The authors find that a $1.00 increase in 
the ENDS tax rate increases adult daily smoking propensity by 5.3% and the probability of “dual 
use” (i.e., consuming both ENDS and cigarettes) by 24.4%. Further, a $1.00 increase in the 
cigarette tax rate leads to a 14.2% increase in adult daily vaping (Pesko, Courtemanche, and 
Maclean 2020). Considering the experience of Minnesota, which adopted the first in the nation 
ENDS tax in August 2010, Saffer et al. (2020) test the effect of ENDS taxation on adult 
smoking. Using synthetic control methods, the authors find that adult smoking increases while 
cessation decreases following an ENDS tax hike. The results imply a cross-elasticity of current 
smoking participation with respect to ENDS taxes of 0.13. 
 
Pregnant women: Abouk et al. (2020) study the effects of state and local ENDS taxes on 
pregnant women’s smoking behaviors. The authors use national birth record data from 2013 to 
2017 and investigate the effect of ENDS taxes on pre-pregnancy smoking, prenatal smoking, and 
birth outcomes. They find that raising ENDS taxes by $1.00 increases pre-pregnancy and 
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prenatal smoking by 0.4 percentage points (pp). Using data from the Pregnancy Risk Assessment 
Monitoring System, the authors also find that ENDS taxes reduce pre-pregnancy ENDS use by 
1.3 pp. 
 
Youth: Two studies examine taxation effects among youth and are therefore arguably most 
relevant to the current paper. Pesko and Warman (2021) examine the effect of Minnesota’s 2013 
ENDS tax increase—that is, above the tax level when first adopted in 2010—on youth smoking. 
The authors find that a 100% ad valorem tax increases cigarettes smoked among youth 
(unconditional on smoking status) by five additional cigarettes per month, or a little over three 
packs monthly for smokers using the mean youth smoking rate of 7.9%. Anderson, Matsuzawa, 
and Sabia (2020) primarily study the effect of cigarette taxes on youth marijuana use, but include 
an extension to the main analysis estimating the effect of ENDS tax adoption in three states 
(California, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia) using two waves of YRBSS data (2015 and 2017), 
one of the datasets we employ. Their empirical models use an indicator variable for ENDS taxes, 
implicitly treating all taxes equivalently regardless of their size and ignoring later changes in 
state ENDS tax rates. They find that ENDS tax adoption reduces current ENDS use by 3.4 pp 
and daily ENDS use by 0.8 pp, with imprecisely estimated effects on cigarette use.  
 
To further our understanding of how ENDS taxes impact youth vaping and smoking, we 
build on these two studies in several ways. First, we leverage variation in ENDS taxes generated 
by ten states and two counties rather than a single state (Pesko and Warman 2021) or three states 
(Anderson, Matsuzawa, and Sabia 2020). Second, we quantify and exploit heterogeneity in 
ENDS tax magnitudes. These tax sizes vary substantially, from $0.05 per fluid milliliter (mL) in 
Delaware, Kansas, Louisiana, and North Carolina to over a $1.00 per fluid mL in California, 
Minnesota, and Washington DC. Considering these differences allows us to report our findings 
in standard tax-elasticity terms and informs policy discussions by quantifying effects on youth 
tobacco product use for a specific tax policy. Third, we explore ENDS tax effects on how youth 
obtain ENDS. Given evidence that the 2019 outbreak of vaping-associated lung injuries was 
driven by additives in informally-sourced vaping products, shifts in youth product sourcing—
e.g., from licensed retailers to informal contacts who may mix their own vaping concentrates 
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outside of a retail setting like a vape shop—could have substantive health implications. Fourth, 
we consider a range of tobacco products that are common among youth but are taxed less 
aggressively (e.g., cigars), allowing us to characterize multiple margins along which youth may 
respond to ENDS taxes. 
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1. Data 
Our analyses match policy data to two survey datasets, each of which has complementary 
strengths: the annual MTF dataset and the biennial YRBSS. Restricted-use, annual MTF data 
cover a nationally representative sample of 8th-, 10th-, and 12th-grade students in middle and high 
schools in the contiguous US, interviewing about 45,000 youth from nearly 400 public and 
private schools each year. Our main analytic sample is comprised of the 2014 to 2019 MTF data, 
as the survey first asked about ENDS use in 2014 and the most recent data available are from 
2019. However, we extend the sample back to 2011 for cigarette use outcomes in a sensitivity 
analysis. Restricted-use MTF data allow us to identify the county where each respondent’s 
school is located, in order to match respondents to their tobacco policy exposure at the county 
level.  
The MTF survey includes several questions about cigarette and ENDS use and perceived 
risk of regular ENDS use. We use different questions to create the following variables, as 
described in detail in the Online Data Appendix: current ENDS use,3 frequent ENDS use (20 or 
more days over the past 30 days), ENDS initiation during the school year, ever ENDS use, 
current cigarette use, current cigarette or cigar use, current half pack daily cigarette use, and 
perceived likelihood of regular ENDS use being highly risky. In general, MTF information is 
collected across six different surveys (forms) each year, with ENDS questions included on a 
subset of these forms. Consequently, ENDS sample sizes are somewhat smaller than cigarette 
 
3 Since 2017, MTF has asked respondents more detailed questions about ENDS use, including questions on whether 
respondents “vape” nicotine, marijuana, or flavoring. For these years, we consider vaping nicotine as ENDS use, but 
not vaping marijuana. This general change in the wording of the ENDS-related questions will be captured in the 
models by the period fixed-effects. We also show later (Appendix Table 8) that redefining our outcome as “any 
vaping” to be consistent with the pre-2017 questionnaire wording and ignoring the detail provided from the post-
2017 change, has very little effect on the main estimates. 
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sample sizes. Ever ENDS use and ENDS initiation in particular were not collected in 2014 and 
only on select forms thereafter. For some years, some small states do not have any schools 
participating in the MTF survey. We focus our main MTF analyses to a balanced sample of 
states in order to reduce sampling variability, which causes six small states to fall out of 
regression analysis, including two with e-cigarette taxes.4 Reassuringly, our results also hold 
when estimated on an unbalanced panel.  
 The National and State YRBSS survey high school students in public and private schools 
across the US about their health behaviors biennially. The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) administer the National YRBSS, while State YRBSS data are collected by 
state education and health departments under CDC supervision, using a similar survey 
instrument. As YRBSS first asked about ENDS use in 2015, our analytic sample is limited to 
2015-2019. Pooling the National and State datasets provides for greater statistical power due to 
an increased sample size (N>580,000), and ensures that all states that adopted an ENDS tax by 
the end of June 2019 are represented.  
 YRBSS asks about ever use and frequency of past-30-day use for cigarettes, “electronic 
vapor product[s]” followed by example brand names marketed as nicotine e-cigarettes (e.g., Juul, 
Vuse, blu),5 and “cigars, cigarillos, or little cigars,” as well as how respondents usually obtain 
ENDS products. Additionally, the final two surveys also collected information on youth source 
of ENDS (e.g., retail, internet, social, other). While National and State YRBSS identify the state 
where a respondents’ school is located, they do not provide county or other substate identifiers. 
We weight both the MTF and the state and national YRBSS to return nationally 
representative results. To construct weights, we use the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, 
Epidemiology and End Results Program (SEER) data to calculate the state-by-year share of the 
youth population that falls in each age-by-gender-by-race/ethnicity bin i, sist (age 14, age 15, age 
16, age 17, age 18, male, female, non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and other 
race/ethnicity). We then calculate each respondent's sample weight as [sist/nist]*StatePop14_18st, 
where nist is the number of YRBSS sampled individuals in age-by-gender-by-race-ethnicity bin i 
in state s at year t and StatePop14_18st is the SEER estimated population of 14-to-18-year-olds in 
 
4 MTF disclosure rules prevent naming specific states. 
5 Please see Online Data Appendix for question prompts and wording. 
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state s at year t. In this construction, we are following the recent literature that applies similar 
SEER-constructed weights in analyses of the combined YRBSS data (Rees, Sabia, and Kumpas 
(2020); Bryan et al. (2020); and Sabia and Anderson (2016)). We use the SEER-constructed 
weights to accommodate the multi-year and multi-grade MTF analysis, and to maintain 
consistency with the YRBSS analysis. Sensitivity analyses also show that our results are similar 
when using unweighted data. 
We match tobacco control and other related policy data from public and proprietary 
sources to respondents by county for MTF and by state for YRBSS (since we do not have sub-
state level information for YRBSS). We match these policy data by quarter for MTF and by year 
for YRBSS, since the YRBSS does not include month or quarter of interview information. In 
particular, we average values across the 1st and 2nd quarters of each YRBSS survey year to match 
that survey’s spring semester time frame. Policy variables include cigarette excise taxes (the 
summation of federal, state, and local), comprehensive smoking bans, comprehensive vaping 
bans, ENDS MLSA laws, Tobacco 21 laws, beer taxes, vertical ID laws, medical and 
recreational marijuana laws, unemployment rates, and poverty rates. See the Online Data 
Appendix for further information and sources. All local laws are population-weighted to the 
county level for MTF and to the state level for YRBSS. All monetary variables are adjusted to 
2019 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index. 
 Our main policy variable of interest is the state or local ENDS tax rate. ENDS taxes are 
levied in different ways, including as an excise tax per unit or fluid mL of liquid, or as an ad 
valorem tax on wholesale prices. These data are standardized to a single ENDS tax per fluid mL 
measure as shown in Table 1. For reference, one Juul pod has 0.7 fluid mL, equivalent to 
approximately one pack of cigarettes (Truth Initiative 2019).6 
 Table 2 reports MTF and YRBSS descriptive statistics with weights for the variables 
discussed above, separately for the overall sample and two sub-samples: areas that implemented 
ENDS taxes by the end of 2019 and areas that did not. Current ENDS use rates are 15.1% in 
MTF and 21.1% in YRBSS, with mean rates approximately 1.5 pp higher in non-treated than 
treated states. Current cigarette use rates are approximately 6.6% in the MTF and 8.1% in the 
 
6 Between 2014 to 2019, the correlation between population-weighted state-level, quarterly e-cigarette taxes and 
cigarette taxes was 30.4%, suggesting significant independent variation remains in both variables. 
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YRBSS, and are also moderately higher in non-treated states. YRBSS results may report higher 
ENDS use in part because YRBSS only includes high school students, whereas MTF also 
includes 8th graders, who are less likely to use these products. 
 Non-adopting states appear to have higher shares of white, non-Hispanic youth, and less 
restrictive tobacco control regulation generally, though higher beer taxes and less marijuana 
access. Unweighted descriptive results are provided in Appendix Table 1. 
 
3.2. Methods 
To investigate the effect of ENDS taxes on youth vaping and smoking outcomes, we 
estimate the following regression model for county-level MTF data: 
(1) 𝑌𝑖𝑙𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑙 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑐𝑖𝑔 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑙𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽2 + 𝑍𝑐𝑡𝛽3 + 𝑖𝑙𝑡 . 
The parameter 𝛽1 is the coefficient of interest, which captures the effect of ENDS taxes on our 
outcomes. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a covariate matrix comprised of individual-level sociodemographic variables 
(gender, age, grade, and race/ethnicity [white, Black, Hispanic, and other], along with missing-
value indicators for each sociodemographic variable). 𝑍𝑐𝑡 adjusts for the policies described 
above. Standard errors are clustered by state for both data sources.   
Distinct analyses will consider each of the following outcomes as 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡: any ENDS use in 
the past 30 days, frequent ENDS use (20 or more days over the past 30 days), initiating ENDS 
use during the school year, current cigarette use, various measures of heavy cigarette use, current 
cigarette or cigar use, perceived likelihood of regular ENDS use being highly risky, and source 
of ENDS (e.g., retail, internet, social, other).  
The above specification is based on a continuous treatment difference-in-differences 
research design, capitalizing on the variation in treatment intensity generated from states newly 
adopting ENDS taxes of varying levels and some states making further changes to their tax rates 
post-adoption.  The specification includes “two-way fixed effects” (TWFE) to account for spatial 
and temporal heterogeneity. Fixed-effects for year-quarter of interview (𝛿𝑡) adjust for national 
time trends, while area fixed-effects (𝛾𝑙) adjust for time-invariant differences in the outcome 
variable by tax jurisdiction l, defined here as states with two exceptions: Cook County, Illinois 
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and Montgomery County, Maryland, both of which are separated from their respective states due 
to local ENDS taxes, as in other work (Cotti et al. 2021; Allcott and Rafkin 2021). As the vast 
majority of our identifying variation comes from time-varying state-policies and the data are not 
representative at the county-level, tax jurisdiction fixed effects were preferred to county-fixed-
effects (to avoid losing variation from counties that were not surveyed before and after an ENDS 
tax change). 
 As YRBSS data lack interview quarter and county identifiers, we conduct those analyses 
at the state-by-year level rather than tax jurisdiction-by-quarter level. Otherwise, the MTF and 
YRBSS specifications are identical. 
   
4. Results 
4.1 Effects on ENDS outcomes 
 Table 3 presents estimates of the standardized ENDS tax rate’s effects on youth ENDS 
use. The first four columns’ specifications leverage the MTF’s ENDS data availability to 
estimate responses along various consumption margins. Coefficient estimates generally suggest 
that higher ENDS taxes are effective in reducing use among youth, with marginally significant 
reductions (10% level) in current and regular ENDS use, and a statistically significant decline in 
ever-use. Specifically, a $1.00 increase in the standardized tax, which represents about twice the 
observed standard deviation in the tax, reduces the likelihood of currently using ENDS by 1.9 pp 
(model 1). The estimated ENDS participation tax elasticity is -0.08, which under reasonable 
assumptions translates into an ENDS participation price elasticity of -0.47 for the youth 
population.7,8  
 
7 The elasticity is estimated based on the mean tax rate and e-cigarette outcome for the treated units. In other words, 
ε = β∙𝔼(x)/𝔼(y), where 𝔼(x) and 𝔼(y) are calculated using data points from the treated units over the sample period. 
We use the treated units for this calculation for two reasons. First, note that 𝔼(x) is by definition zero for the non-
treated units. Second, this measure of the elasticity captures the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), 
summarizing what would have happened to the tobacco use outcomes in the treated states in the absence of the 
treatment. 
8 The price elasticity can be derived from the tax elasticity as follows: εPrice = εTax * (1/Tax pass-through) * (1/Share 
of tax in the price). Cotti et al. (2020) estimate that e-cigarette taxes are generally fully passed on to retail prices, and 
comprise about 16% of the observed retail price. If the tax pass-through is larger than one, which is possible under 
monopsony market conditions, then the implied price elasticity would be lower in magnitude. For instance, if the tax 
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The ENDS participation margin here combines regular users and occasional users. Most 
adolescents (about three out of four) who report currently using ENDS do so occasionally and 
are not regular users (see Table 2). When we expressly consider whether higher ENDS taxes 
impact those who use ENDS more frequently, we continue to find a marginally significant 
negative effect. Comparing the coefficient estimates between current use and regular use 
indicates that about two-thirds of the reduction in current use associated with higher ENDS taxes 
is driven by a reduction in regular use (1.3/1.9 pp), suggesting that this latter, more intense, 
margin of use is especially elastic. This pattern is borne out by the estimated tax elasticity of 
regular use, which is more than double the participation elasticity (-0.21 vs. -0.08).  
Current ENDS participation also includes first-time consumers. The initiation margin is 
particularly salient for adolescents given the rising prevalence of youth ENDS use and because 
adolescent initiation may influence future transitions and paths to nicotine dependence. Column 
(3)’s results suggest that higher ENDS taxes may deter initiation, with an imprecisely estimated 
but meaningful effect magnitude: implied tax and price elasticities (-0.06 and -0.38) are similar 
to those for ENDS participation. This imprecision may be due to initiation being a noisy 
measure.9 We therefore turn to ever-use of ENDS, which is directly reported in the data, as a 
proxy for initiation and experimentation (Dave et al. 2019). By definition, changes in ever-use 
between years (t-1) and (t) — the variation being leveraged in fixed-effects models — equal the 
prevalence of new initiates and experimenters in year (t). Thus, taxes’ effects on ever-use should 
reflect their impacts on new initiation and experimentation. We find a significant and relatively 
large effect of ENDS taxes on ever-use of ENDS: the estimated tax elasticity of -0.15 suggests 
that the initiation and experimentation margins for youths are responsive to higher taxes, and 
perhaps even more so than participation.10 Estimates based on the ever-use measure, however, 
 
pass-through is 1.33 (see Saffer et al. 2020), then the implied e-cigarette price-participation elasticity would be -
0.35. 
9 Initiation generally cannot be measured directly in surveys, including MTF. As noted in the Online Data Appendix, 
a youth is defined as initiating e-cigarette use if their grade at the time of interview matches the grade they reported 
first trying e-cigarettes. The measurement error in initiation may stem from potential recall errors in the reported 
grade at first use, and potential temporal mismatch between the academic year (when the initiation occurred over 
this period) and the calendar year/month over which our e-cigarette tax measures are matched. 
10 The confidence intervals across these estimates overlap, however, and we are not able to reject the null that the tax 
elasticities for participation, regular use, and ever-use are similar. 
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should be interpreted with care: this measure’s ability to capture initiation and experimentation 
effects relies on certain assumptions that we test below.11 
Reassuringly, the last column in Table 3 confirms that higher taxes significantly and 
effectively reduce current ENDS use in a different adolescent sample (YRBSS). That coefficient 
estimate is larger than the MTF estimate, perhaps due in part to higher mean ENDS use in the 
YRBSS, which started collecting ENDS data later and considered older respondents (high school 
students only) than MTF (Table 2).12  
The own-tax elasticity ranges from -0.06 to -0.21 across these margins and datasets.13 
Estimates of the cross-effects of cigarette taxes on ENDS use are generally insignificant, in line 
with recent evidence that cigarette taxes may have lost their bite in terms of affecting youth 
(Hansen et al. 2017). Only for regular ENDS use is there a marginally significant effect of 
cigarette taxes, suggesting that higher cigarette taxes may drive some adolescents to substitute 
towards frequent ENDS use, consistent with the products being economic substitutes for youth.  
Table 4 reports estimates for other outcomes related to ENDS use, including perceived 
risk (from the MTF) and source of ENDS purchases (from the YRBSS). Column (1) suggests 
that higher ENDS taxes significantly increase the perceived risk of using that product. While 
stricter tax policy might lead adolescents to adjust their risk beliefs directly, perhaps by reducing 
the general availability of ENDS and drying up the social market, an alternative explanation is 
that risk beliefs are concurrent to (or bundled with) individuals’ consumption decisions. For 
instance, Viscusi (2016) finds that cigarettes users expect ENDS to be less risky than non-users. 
In this context, the reduction in ENDS use and initiation (Table 3) and the upward adjustment of 
the perceived risk of ENDS use (Table 4, column 1) go hand-in-hand.  
Given that retailers are restricted from selling ENDS to youth (by federal law since 
August 2016 and in most states even earlier than that), the finding that youth are responding to 
 
11 Specifically, since ever-use is a cumulative “stock” measure, and changes in ever-use across adjacent periods 
capture the “flow” of new initiates and experimenters, the implicit assumption for the estimate in column (4) to 
capture effects on initiation and experimentation is absence of policy endogeneity (tax policy in period t is 
orthogonal to ever-use in t-1). We assess this assumption and present various checks in the results that follow. 
12 The imputed tax elasticity based on the YRBSS estimates is around -0.16, about double the estimate from the 
MTF, though overlapping confidence intervals do not permit us to reject the null of no difference. 
13 These estimates and the implied own-price elasticity estimates (-0.38 to -1.31) are very similar to those derived 
for cigarettes in the 1990’s and 2000’s (Ross and Chaloupka 2003; Carpenter and Cook 2008), though the most 
recent evidence suggests that youth are now far less responsive to cigarette taxes and prices. 
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the monetary cost of a product that they are legally restricted from purchasing may appear 
counterintuitive.14 However, as shown in Table 2, a sizeable fraction (25%) of adolescents who 
use ENDS report purchasing the product themselves either through retail or internet sources 
(25%). These individuals would be directly affected by any increase in the monetary cost. Others 
who obtain ENDS through social sources or third-party purchases may also be affected (e.g., if 
price increases are passed on via the third party or affect peers’ willingness to share).15  
As expected, retail purchases by youth are the most responsive to higher ENDS taxes (see 
Table 4). A $1.00 increase in ENDS taxes reduces the likelihood that youth obtain their ENDS 
through retail sources by about 7.6 pp (41.1% relative to the sample mean). Moreover, we also 
find a significant reduction in “other sources” (e.g., taking ENDS from a store or person). These 
findings are consistent with Table 3’s coefficient estimates, corroborating the hypothesis that 
higher taxes decrease youth ENDS consumption primarily through retail purchases. Moreover, 
the indication that higher taxes may shift how teens acquire ENDS is notable. Specifically, 
among those who continue to use ENDS, there is evidence of substitution away from retail and 
other sources into social sources (10.1 pp or 16.1% increase), a shift which may have direct 
adverse health effects if such informally, socially-sourced ENDS products are more likely to be 
contaminated with unknown additives. Critically, higher cigarette taxes, which lower the relative 
cost of ENDS, appear to have inverse effects, encouraging significant substitution towards retail 
ENDS purchases and away from the social market. 
 
4.2 Effects on cigarettes and other tobacco use 
 While higher ENDS taxes appear to significantly deter youth from using ENDS, the 
public health implications of this impact depend on potential substitution towards other higher-
risk tobacco products. We assess this possibility with the results reported in Table 5, considering 
reported use of combustible tobacco products (cigarettes and cigars) from MTF (columns 1-3) 
and YRBSS (columns 4-7). Coefficient estimates based on the MTF sample suggest that higher 
ENDS taxes significantly increase cigarette use, on both the extensive and intensive margins. 
 
14 All models control for state adoption of minimum legal sales age restrictions for e-cigarettes. 
15 In the case of cigarettes, youth acquisition in the social market has generally not been found to be responsive to 
cost, though higher cigarette taxes do reduce the likelihood of youth obtaining their cigarettes through third-party 
purchases (Katzman, Markowitz, and McGeary 2007; Hansen, Rees, and Sabia 2013) 
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Consumption of at least a half pack per day is particularly responsive to shifts in ENDS tax 
policy, with an estimated elasticity of 0.34 (compared to the cross-tax participation elasticity of 
0.12). YRBSS sample estimates suggest a similar pattern of substitution into cigarette use from 
higher ENDS taxes, with coefficient estimates largely similar to the MTF estimates though 
highly imprecise due to inflated standard errors. Across outcomes, own-effects of cigarette taxes 
are negative but not statistically distinguishable from zero.16 
 If ENDS taxes impact the demand for other tobacco products only through their direct 
effects on the demand for ENDS, the own-tax effects on ENDS use in Table 3 can be construed 
as a “first-stage” effect, bounding the size of the impacted adolescent population that may 
substitute towards other tobacco products. Specifically, MTF estimates suggest that a $1.00 
increase in the ENDS tax reduces ENDS participation by about two pp. We would therefore not 
expect the spillover effects of ENDS taxes on cigarettes to be larger than this magnitude. About 
2% of adolescents (based on the MTF) are changing their ENDS use behaviors due to higher 
ENDS taxation, and a subset of these (1.3 pp or about 68% of the impacted population) are 
switching to cigarettes. This “treatment-on-the-treated” effect is smaller if we use the YRBSS 
estimates, which suggest that as many as 23% of teens who respond to higher ENDS taxes with 
reduced ENDS use are substituting towards regular cigarette use. Such scaled estimates should 
be interpreted with caution, and are meant to be suggestive, since they can vary dramatically 
with small changes in the underlying parameters. Nevertheless, they provide a means to gauge 
the credibility of estimated ENDS tax effect-sizes, and broadly suggest that a non-negligible 
fraction of teens incentivized to reduce their use of ENDS could be substituting into combustible 
tobacco use instead. 
 
4.3 Effects on dual-use and any use outcomes 
Across our sample period, approximately 30% of current (past-month) ENDS users also 
currently use cigarettes. From a health perspective, “dual-use” could represent a good or bad 
outcome. Dual-use of e-cigarettes and a combustible tobacco product could be health-improving 
 
16 The cigarette participation elasticity ranges from -0.03 to -0.36, and is not statistically significant in any of the 
specifications. This pattern is in line with recent evidence suggesting that youth are no longer very responsive to 
changes in cigarette taxes (Hansen, Sabia, and Rees 2017). 
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if it represents attempts to quit and/or reduce cigarette smoking, or health-deteriorating if it 
facilitates continued smoking among individuals who would otherwise quit (e.g., if they could 
not continue using nicotine in smoke-free locations). In Table 6, we do not find statistically-
significant evidence that e-cigarette taxes affect youth dual-use or for that matter, an indicator for 
any use indicator (i.e., of e-cigarette or combustible tobacco). 
 
4.4 Heterogeneous effects of ENDS taxes 
 In Figures 2-4, we assess whether vaping- and smoking-responses to ENDS taxes differ 
across gender, age, and race. These figures summarize estimates from stratified samples, parallel 
to the pooled-sample coefficient estimates presented in Tables 3-5. In our discussion of these 
results, we draw on the weight of the evidence across broad patterns that emerge from these 
coefficient estimates. 
 Figures 2a and 2b respectively present heterogeneous responses in ENDS use across sub-
populations from the MTF and the YRBSS. The effect of higher ENDS taxes on ENDS use is 
largely negative for all groups, though some interesting differentials emerge. While ENDS taxes 
affect male and female ever-use similarly, only females show statistically significant current- and 
regular-use responses. The tax effect is also generally larger for older adolescents (ages 16+) 
than younger adolescents (ages < 16), consistent with more ENDS use among older teens. This 
pattern may also reflect greater reliance on retail sources among older teens, as retail purchases 
are expected to be more elastic to cost.17 Though not statistically-significantly different, whites 
may also be somewhat more tax-responsive in their ENDS use than non-whites. 
 When it comes to risk perceptions regarding ENDS, there is some indication that female 
teens’ risk beliefs are more elastic with respect to taxes than males (Figure 3a). Differences are 
even more evident by race: white teens exhibit a much stronger and significant upward revision 
of their perceived risk of ENDS in response to ENDS taxes, while effects for non-white teens are 
close to zero and insignificant. 
 
17 According to 2017 and 2019 YRBSS data, 27.7% of teens ages 16+, who are e-cigarette users, report obtaining 
their e-cigarettes via retail sources; in contrast, only 5.5% of younger e-cigarette users report that they acquired their 
e-cigarettes via retail sources. Additionally, only 21.2% of current ENDS users report retail sources of e-cigarettes, 
but this rises to 38.7% and 42.9% for frequent and daily users. 
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 Figure 3b presents differential effects across sources of ENDS acquisition based on the 
YRBSS. Mirroring the heterogeneity in consumption and use by age, we find that retail 
purchases (a much more important source of ENDS for older teens and teens that regularly use e-
cigarettes) are more responsive to taxes for older than younger adolescents. Similarly, higher 
ENDS taxes appear to significantly limit younger teens’ reliance on the social market, a source 
which tends to be relatively more important for that age-group.18 This relationship may operate 
as a chain reaction, since many younger teens obtain ENDS by borrowing them from friends or 
older peers. Specifically, if ENDS taxes constrain older peers’ ability to purchase ENDS from 
retail sources, downstream effects may limit younger teens’ ENDS access through social sources. 
Figure 3b also suggests that older teens may respond to ENDS taxes by substituting towards 
social sources (Figure 3b) and constraining their own retail purchases, though the substitution 
here is less than one-to-one. This behavior might be explained if, ex ante, older teens are more 
likely to pay for their ENDS, while younger teens rely more on “bumming” a vape. In this case, 
ENDS taxes would have more impact for older teens, and thus larger effects on their current and 
frequent ENDS use, in line with Figures 2a and 2b. Those who substantially reduce their ENDS 
use in response to taxes may fall back on bumming ENDS from social sources—a habit that 
might be less socially acceptable or viewed as freeloading for regular or heavy users—instead of 
purchasing ENDS themselves.19 
 Finally, we assess heterogeneity in the cross-tax effects on combustible cigarette use in 
Figures 4a (for the MTF) and 4b (for the YRBSS). While the YRBSS effect estimates are too 
imprecise to discern meaningful patterns, spillover effects on cigarette use in the MTF sample 
mainly line up with the first-order effects on ENDS use. In particular, older and white teens tend 
to display a stronger substitution response towards cigarettes than younger and non-white teens. 
 
5. Checks of validity and robustness  
 
18 According to 2017 and 2019 YRBSS data, 74.2% of e-cigarette users under age 16 report obtaining e-cigarettes 
through borrowing from family or friends, a source less commonly reported by older teens (56.6%). 
19 We also find that older teens may have substituted from retail outlets to internet purchases, potentially allowing 
some to evade ENDS taxes, particularly prior to the US Supreme Court’s June 2018 South Dakota v Wayfair Inc 
decision. Before then, responsibility to pay remote sellers’ sales taxes largely fell on consumers, making it difficult 
to enforce tax collections, including for ENDS. That case’s ruling allowed states to require remote sellers to collect 
these taxes, a policy most states adopted towards the end of 2018 or later; that is, at the end of our period of analysis.  
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Table 7 and appendix materials provide additional checks to assess the identifying 
assumption’s validity and explore our main results’ sensitivity to alternate specifications, 
measurement error in the ENDS tax rate, added observable confounders, and sampling and other 
estimation issues. 
 The tax-response parameters are identified off within-state changes over the sample 
period in the two-way fixed effects models, drawing on the assumption of strict exogeneity 
(Wooldridge 2010). This implicitly presumes that states that have not adopted any ENDS taxes, 
or states that have not changed their ENDS taxes, are valid counterfactuals for the “treated” 
states. More specifically, a consistent estimate of the tax-response parameter (β1 in equation 1) 
requires that the tax rate in a given state/locality and period t be orthogonal to that locality’s error 
term in all periods. Violations of this assumption are usually driven by either time-varying state-
specific unobservables correlated with the ENDS tax, or policy endogeneity, wherein the state’s 
past experiences with youth ENDS use may influence its enactment and level of ENDS taxation.  
The recency of ENDS taxes in most adopting states, combined with the start of the 
availability of ENDS data in youth surveys, prevents estimation of flexible event-study models 
for ENDS use outcomes. We therefore check for potential policy endogeneity and assess the 
broader identifying assumption by re-estimating all models with the inclusion of the one-period 
lead in tax adoption (Table 7), with the reference being prior leads.20 These models underscore 
two points which instill some degree of confidence in the credibility of the research design. First, 
coefficient estimates on the lead for ENDS adoption are statistically insignificant, invariably 
smaller than the main effect, and largely close to zero in all models. This finding suggests that 
trends in ENDS use outcomes prior to the adoption of the tax do not materially differ between 
treated and control states. Second, our main ENDS tax effects on ENDS and cigarette use and the 
implied elasticities are not materially altered by controlling for the lead on policy adoption.  
An emerging literature has identified important issues that arise with a TWFE setting 
with staggered adoption of the treatment, as in our case with multiple states/localities shifting 
their ENDS tax policy at different times. In the presence of dynamic treatment effects, the 
 
20 In Appendix Table 2, we present alternate specifications for the lead effects based on the date of enactment (as 
opposed to when the tax became effective in the state/locality) in order to capture potential anticipation or 
“announcement” effects. These estimates remain largely similar to those presented in Table 7. 
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treatment effect recovered by the TWFE model may be biased and may capture the true 
treatment effect plus additional terms that reflect deviations from parallel trends and bias due to 
treatment effect dynamics (Goodman-Bacon 2021). The latter bias is often largely due to using 
earlier-treated units as a counterfactual for later-treated units. This issue of heterogenous 
treatment effect dynamics may be less problematic here than in other contexts given that only 
nine states plus Washington DC and two large counties imposed taxes on ENDS by mid-2019, 
when our sample ends. Consequently, we have a large untreated comparison group and, as 
ENDS taxes are relatively recent phenomena within US markets, few instances of earlier-treated 
units serving as a counterfactual for later-treated units, minimizing such concerns. This 
hypothesis is confirmed by a formal Goodman-Bacon decomposition (Goodman-Bacon 2021) of 
the comparisons driving the estimated treatment effects in our MTF analyses (we dichotomize 
our tax variable). This decomposition indicates that between 91.6% and 94.4% of the weight of 
our estimator (depending on outcome) can be attributed to the comparison of treated states (states 
that have imposed an ENDS tax) versus never adopters, and between 1.9% to 3.0% can be 
attributed to the comparisons of earlier-adopting versus later-adopting states. The potentially 
problematic comparison—using earlier-treated or already-treated states as a counterfactual for 
later-treated states—drives only about 3.7% to 5.4% of the average treatment effect in our 
estimation.21  
 
21 As an additional check, we also applied the recently proposed “stacked estimator,” which can account for bias 
attributable to heterogeneous treatment effects with a staggered treatment rollout (Cengiz et al. 2019). First, we 
create cohorts comprised of treatment and “clean” controls two years prior to and one year after an event (“event 
window”), where an event is the year an ENDS tax went into effect as defined in a cohort OR became effective for 
all youth surveyed in that year. “Clean” controls are states that did not adopt an ENDS tax during the event window. 
Thus, we avoid “forbidden” comparisons (i.e., using previously treated observations as a control) by construction. 
Constraining the length of the event window similarly for each treatment cohort minimizes concerns related to 
differential treatment variance that impacts the OLS weighting scheme. Each treated tax state is entered and matched 
separately, even if multiple states may have enacted their tax in the same year, due to differences in the level of the 
treatment (tax amount). For states that have multiple tax changes, we do not consider later tax changes that occurred 
outside the event window since these states are already treated and the effects of later tax changes may be conflated 
with potential dynamic effects of the earlier tax changes. The regressions include cohort-specific time and state 
fixed-effects. Reassuringly, the stacked continuous treatment difference-in-differences estimates continue to suggest, 
as before, that higher ENDS taxes are associated with significant decreases in ever ENDS use (3.4 pp), and increases 
in cigarette use (1.4 pp) and intense cigarette use (0.7 pp) in the MTF.  Findings for the YRBSS, while not 
statistically significant, also indicate a similar-sized increase in cigarette use (1.3 pp) and in regular and daily 
cigarette use (1.6 – 1.8 pp). We are not able to apply the stacked estimator to the YRBSS for e-cigarette use since 
these data are not available for sufficient number of waves (available for biennial waves: 2015, 2017, 2019). The 
consistency between these stacked estimates and the standard estimates is ex post validating and ex ante expected 
given that very little of estimation of the treatment effect in our main analyses is driven by the potentially 
problematic comparisons (as reflected by the Goodman-Bacon decomposition). Moreover, the recency of ENDS 
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 Further checks assess our findings’ plausibility and verify that they are robust to alternate 
specifications, measurement error in the tax measure, and adjustment for sampling issues. First, 
we confirm that our estimated tax effects are not sensitive to correcting for potential 
measurement error in our constructed standardized ENDS tax rate. In Appendix Table 3, we 
present instrumental (IV) estimates from models where the standardized tax rate is instrumented 
with the separate tax components (i.e., ad valorem tax rate, liquid excise tax rate, container 
excise tax rate). The F-statistic is large, and the results are virtually identical to those discussed 
above.  
Second, we consider potential confounding from cigar taxes (Appendix Table 4). Results 
are similar to our main findings. 
Third, we estimate various sensitivity checks of the MTF in particular since these data are 
more detailed than the YRBSS data. We add controls for parental education and the county’s 
urban/rural status from the MTF (Appendix Table 5),22 use a non-balanced panel of states 
(Appendix Table 6), and use a broader “any vaping” variable (including of THC) that became 
available in 2017 (Appendix Table 7). Our conclusions are not materially altered from these 
alternative approaches. 
Fourth, we re-implement our analyses to confirm that our estimates are not sensitive to 
modeling the dichotomous outcomes via probit regression (marginal effects presented in 
Appendix Table 8), and to various sampling issues. Specifically, our findings are largely robust 
in terms of magnitude and statistical significance, to not utilizing sampling weights (Appendix 
Table 9), extending our sample back to 2011 for models of cigarette use outcomes (Appendix 
Table 10), and adjusting our inferential statistics to account for the small number of treated units 




taxation and the limited time window over which states have been adopting these taxes also serves to minimize 
differential treatment variance and related weighting issues (Goodman-Bacon 2021). 
22 These latter individual-level controls are not available in the YRBSS. We therefore did not include them in our 
main analyses in order to keep the specifications for the MTF and the YRBSS samples consistent. 
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The FDA is currently assessing whether specific ENDS products are sufficiently 
appropriate for public health to be legally sold in the United States. The FDA is currently 
allowing the sale of ENDS through enforcement discretion while these products undergo review 
for public health benefit.23 Policy evaluation research is particularly well-suited to assessing 
ENDS’ overall effect on public health by estimating how reducing the accessibility or appeal of 
ENDS affects use of more lethal, combustible tobacco products. If reducing ENDS accessibility 
increases combustible tobacco use, as suggested by this and other studies (Pesko, Courtemanche, 
and Maclean 2020; Saffer et al. 2020; Pesko and Warman 2021; Abouk et al. 2020; Cotti et al. 
2021; Friedman 2015; Dave, Feng, and Pesko 2019; Pesko, Hughes, and Faisal 2016; Pesko and 
Currie 2019), this finding provides evidence of a public health benefit to allow ENDS sales: 
reduced cigarette use. This benefit should be used alongside other estimates of public health 
benefits and harms of ENDS, which are beyond the scope of this study, to inform the FDA’s 
decisions on approving ENDS products. 
While the FDA does not control ENDS taxes, this study’s findings can still inform 
tobacco regulatory sciences because an ENDS ban is analogous to an infinite ENDS tax increase. 
Thus, the FDA has the ability to “tax” ENDS at that one level (i.e., infinite) by banning them, as 
has done in at least 30 other countries (Global Tobacco Control 2018). More generally, the 
FDA’s interest in understanding transitions across tobacco products can benefit from ENDS 
policy evaluation research, even studies of policies outside the FDA’s purview, since these 
studies provide plausibly exogenous variation in ENDS use that can be leveraged to estimate the 
causal effect of ENDS use on subsequent combustible tobacco product use. 
Our study is particularly unique by 1) using multiple large-scale youth survey datasets to 
provide some of the first national evidence on ENDS taxes on youth, and 2) studying the effect 
of ENDS taxes on youth using four types of outcomes: ENDS use, cigarette use, perceptions of 
the risk of ENDS, and source of ENDS. By estimating ENDS taxes’ effects on youth use of both 
ENDS and cigarettes, as well as intensity of use, ENDS sources, and ENDS risk perceptions, this 
research provides the most comprehensive picture to date of ENDS taxes’ effects on youth, 
whom the taxes are intended to “protect.“ While our results yield e-cigarette tax elasticities 
 
23 The FDA has granted marketing orders for a heat-not-burn product (iQOS), implying that this particular product’s 
availability was judged appropriate for public health. https://www.fda.gov/media/144700/download (last accessed 
August 24th, 2021). 
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ranging from -0.06 to -0.21 depending on the measure of ENDS use, and indicate that ENDS 
taxes increase perceptions of ENDS risks, other findings suggest concurrent costs: cross-tax 
elasticities are positive and particularly large for frequent cigarette use outcomes, and sourcing 
results suggest that ENDS taxes shift youth towards informal ENDS sources. The latter change 
may have implications for short- and long-run health outcomes, as observed during the 2019 
outbreak of vaping-associated lung injuries, when use of off market cannabis vaping products 
containing vitamin E acetate led to a rash of illnesses and deaths. 
As of March 2021, 30 US states had adopted an ENDS tax (Public Health Law Center 
2021), often as a means to reduce youth vaping. However, if reducing ENDS accessibility 
increases combustible tobacco use, as suggested by this study and prior work (Pesko, 
Courtemanche, and Maclean 2020; Saffer et al. 2020; Pesko and Warman 2021; Abouk et al. 
2020; Cotti et al. 2021; Friedman 2015; Dave, Feng, and Pesko 2019; Pesko, Hughes, and Faisal 
2016; Pesko and Currie 2019), these taxes could prove harmful to public health. That is, given 
current evidence suggesting smoking is substantially more dangerous than using ENDS, the 
health costs from greater youth smoking as a result of ENDS taxes may outweigh benefits from 
reduced youth ENDS use, though an exact calculation is beyond the scope of this research.  
Currently, Congress is considering doubling the cigarette excise tax (to $2.01 per pack) 
and setting the ENDS tax to parity with the new cigarette tax (Durbin 2021). This tax, if adopted, 
would imply a roughly $2.01 tax per 0.7 fluid mL of nicotine, assuming a Juul pod is equivalent 
to a pack of cigarettes (Truth Initiative 2019), or $2.87 per fluid mL. Our MTF results suggest 
that this would reduce youth current ENDS use by 5.5 pp but raise current cigarette use by 3.7 
pp, assuming that the cigarette tax portion of the bill has no effect as suggested by the small, 
statistically insignificant cigarette tax effects estimated in this paper, and other recent studies 
(Hansen, Sabia, and Rees 2017). The YRBSS results meanwhile suggest much larger reductions 
in youth current ENDS use, but a sizable increase in youth current cigarette use of 2.3 pp. If 
ENDS are substantially safer products as suggested by several major government-commissioned 
reviews (McNeill et al. 2018; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018; 
UK Committee on Toxicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products and the Environment 
2020), our results suggest that the proposed bill may harm youth health in the United States. 
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Due to the recency of ENDS taxation, our results are based on the experiences of ten 
early adopting states and two large counties. Thus, we may be capturing responses to relatively 
lower levels of taxes than will be in place in future periods. Still, this study’s research design 
provides an important and useful starting point for extending these analyses as future work 
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Table 1: ENDS Tax Changes Through 2nd Quarter of 2019 
Locality Effective Date Unit Taxed Tax Amount 
Tax per mL,  
Q1-2 2015 ($) 
Tax per mL,  
Q1-2 2017 ($) 
Tax per mL,  
Q1-2 2019 ($) 
District/State       





$0  $0.72  $1.65  
Delaware 1/2018 Per fluid milliliter $0.05  $0  $0  $0.05  
Kansas 1/2017, 7/2017 Per fluid milliliter $0.20, $0.05 $0  $0.20  $0.05  
Louisiana 7/2015 Per fluid milliliter $0.05  $0  $0.05  $0.05  
Minnesota 8/2010, 7/2013 Wholesale price 35.0%, 95.0% $2.49  $2.49  $2.49  
North Carolina 6/2015 Per fluid milliliter $0.05  $0.02  $0.05  $0.05  
New Jersey 10/2018 Per fluid milliliter $0.10 $0  $0  $0.10  
Pennsylvania 7/2016 Wholesale price 40.0% $0  $1.05  $1.05  





$0  $1.70  $2.52  
West Virginia 7/2016 Per fluid milliliter $0.08  $0  $0.08  $0.08   
      
County/City       
Chicago, Illinois  
1/2016, 1/2019 
Per container / per fluid 
milliliter1 
$0.80 / $0.55, 
$1.50 / $1.20 
   
Cook County, IL 5/2016 Per fluid milliliter $0.20  $0  $0.94  $1.50  
Montgomery County, MD 8/2015 Wholesale price 30.00% $0  $0.79  $0.79  




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, 2014-2019 (MTF); 2015-2019 (YRBSS) 
 MTF YRBSS 
 Overall Treated Non-Treated Overall Treated Non-Treated 
Outcomes       
Current ENDS User 0.152  0.142  0.156  0.211 0.198 0.215 
[N=126,306] [N=40,298] [N=86,008] [N=538,992] [N=126,637] [N=412,355] 
Frequent ENDS User 0.038  0.035  0.039  0.047 0.049 0.047 
[N=126,306] [N=40,298] [N=86,008] [N=538,992] [N=126,637] [N=412,355] 
Ever ENDS User 0.066  0.060  0.069  0.081 0.073 0.084 
Current Cigarette Smoker [N=244,360] [N=78,538] [N=165,822] [N=580,788] [N=135,993] [N=444,795] 
0.080  0.073  0.083  0.113 0.093 0.117 
Current Cigarette or Cigar Smoker [N=246,192] [N=79,112] [N=167,080] [N=580,788] [N=135,993] [N=444,795] 
0.192  0.199  0.189  0.211 0.198 0.215 
ENDS Perception of Harm Risk [N=86,486] [N=27,804] [N=58,682] - - - 
0.012  0.010  0.012  - - - 
Current Cigarette Smoker (at least a half  
pack a day in the past month) 
[N=244,360] [N=78,538] [N=165,822] - - - 
0.006  0.005  0.006  - - - 
      
Frequent Cigarette Smoker - - - 0.022 0.015 0.023 
- - - [N=580,788] [N=135,993] [N=444,795] 
ENDS Sources*       
Retail Source  - - - 0.212 0.185 0.227 
- - - [N=55,902] [N=22,260] [N=33,642] 
Internet  - - - 0.038 0.042 0.035 
- - - [N=55,902] [N=22,260] [N=33,642] 
Social Source  - - - 0.617 0.628 0.611 
- - - [N=55,902] [N=22,260] [N=33,642] 
Other Source - - - 0.133 0.145 0.126 
- - - [N=55,902] [N=22,260] [N=33,642] 
 
      
Individual Covariates       
Female 0.516  0.514  0.517  0.489 0.489 0.490 
Age 16.005  15.997  16.009  16.003 16.014 16.000 
(1.985) (1.994) (1.981) (1.426) (1.424) (1.426) 
White, non-Hispanic 
0.550  0.472  0.585  0.543 0.487 0.560 
Black/African American, non-Hispanic 
0.148  0.129  0.156  0.148 0.146 0.149 
Hispanic/Latino 
0.237  0.307  0.206  0.240 0.281 0.228 
Other Races, non-Hispanic 
0.066  0.092  0.054  0.068 0.085 0.063 
Grade 10.050  10.083  10.035  10.445 10.481 10.434 
(1.665) (1.647) (1.673) (1.190) (1.195) (1.188) 
       
Policy/Economic Covariates       
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.174  0.562  - 0.166 0.703 - 
(0.516) (0.801) - (0.456) (0.709)  
28 
 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) 2.967  3.137  2.890  2.954 3.260 2.859 
(1.379) (1.421) (1.353) (1.285) (0.972) (1.353) 
Beer Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.302  0.241  0.330  0.314 0.255 0.332 
(0.277) (0.161) (0.312) (0.286) (0.175) (0.310) 
Tobacco 21 Law 
0.146  0.300  0.077  0.174 0.462 0.085 
ENDS Minimum Legal Sale Age 
0.873  0.936  0.844  0.924 1.000 0.900 
Indoor Smoking Restrictions 
0.802  0.896  0.760  0.792 0.928 0.750 
Indoor ENDS Restrictions 
0.229  0.425  0.141  0.264 0.532 0.181 
Recreational Marijuana Laws 
0.128  0.218  0.087  0.163 0.378 0.096 
Medical Marijuana Laws 
0.526  0.761  0.420  0.579 0.807 0.508 
Vertical License Law 
0.968  0.963  0.970  0.975 0.959 0.980 
Unemployment Rate 4.862  5.195  4.713  4.544 4.480 4.563 
(1.576) (1.732) (1.476) (0.880) (0.499) (0.967) 
Poverty Rates 14.200  14.076  14.256  12.697 12.015 12.908 
(5.219) (4.764) (5.411) (2.513) (2.693) (2.416) 
          
N 254,516 81,823 172,693 600,877 139,509 461,368 
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) are reported. Since state/county-level information is available in the MTF 
data, policy/economic controls are at the county level except for beer taxes, vertical ID, and marijuana laws in which we only 
have state-level data. Since county information is not available in the national / state YRBSS, policy/economic controls are 
population-weighted state averages.  
 










ENDS Initiation Ever Use ENDS 
Current ENDS 
User 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.019+ -0.013+ -0.008 -0.052*** -0.071** 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.025) 
[-0.040,0.002] [-0.028,0.001] [-0.036,0.021] [-0.072,-0.031] [-0.120, -0.022] 
<0.071> <0.073> <0.581> <0.000> <0.006> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.005 0.009+ -0.003 0.012 0.041 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.008) (0.026) 
[-0.021,0.012] [-0.001,0.019] [-0.029,0.022] [-0.004,0.028] [-0.012, 0.094] 
<0.552> <0.065> <0.789> <0.135> <0.129> 
Data MTF MTF MTF MTF YRBSS 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 126,306 126,306 66,124 85,541 538,992 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.152 0.038 0.104 0.287 0.213 
ENDS Elasticity -0.075 -0.212 -0.059 -0.146 -0.164 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.095 0.712 -0.097 0.127 0.568 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls 
and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. All YRBSS models include state fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and each of 
the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. Regressions are weighted, standard errors are corrected 
for clustering at the state level, 95% confidence intervals are shown in [ ] and p-values are shown in < >. 
      
      




Retail Source Social Source Internet Source Other Source 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.029* -0.076* 0.101* 0.019 -0.044* 
(0.014) (0.034) (0.046) (0.015) (0.021) 
[0.001,0.057] [-0.143, -0.008] [0.008, 0.194] [-0.012, 0.049] [-0.086, -0.002] 
<0.041> <0.029> <0.034> <0.220> <0.040> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.003 0.086** -0.105* 0.006 0.014 
(0.007) (0.031) (0.049) (0.019) (0.021) 
[-0.017,0.011] [0.023, 0.148] [-0.204, -0.006] [-0.032, 0.044] [-0.029, 0.056] 
<0.671> <0.009> <0.038> <0.747> <0.522> 
Data MTF YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS 
Years 2014-2018 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 86,486 55,902 55,902 55,902 55,902 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.192 0.185 0.627 0.042 0.145 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All YRBSS models include state fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and 
policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. Regressions are weighted, standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state 
























ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.013* 0.006** 0.012+ 0.008 0.016 0.014 0.007 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) 
[0.001,0.026] [0.002,0.010] [-0.001,0.024] [-0.019, 0.035] [-0.011, 0.043] [-0.011, 0.039] [-0.024, 0.038] 
<0.041> <0.008> <0.069> <0.544> <0.244> <0.257> <0.658> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.010 -0.012 -0.008 -0.011 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) 
[-0.011,0.010] [-0.005,0.001] [-0.015,0.012] [-0.035, 0.016] [-0.039, 0.016] [-0.033, 0.016] [-0.045, 0.023] 
<0.892> <0.227> <0.819> <0.544> <0.398> <0.491> <0.502> 
Data MTF MTF MTF YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 2014-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 244,360 244,360 246,192 580,788 580,788 580,788 504,639 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.066 0.012 0.080 0.080 0.019 0.014 0.107 
ENDS Elasticity 0.123 0.341 0.089 0.041 0.336 0.412 0.031 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.032 -0.530 -0.056 -0.355 -1.792 -1.784 -0.321 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed 
in Table 2. All YRBSS models include state fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. 
Regressions are weighted, standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state level, 95% confidence intervals are shown in [ ] and p-values are shown in < >. 




Table 6: Effects of ENDS Tax on ENDS and Combustible Tobacco Product Use 
 
Outcome Current Dual Use Current Any Use Current Dual Use Current Any Use 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 
0.004 -0.01 0.005 -0.046 
(0.004) (0.013) (0.012) (0.034) 
[-0.004,0.012] [-0.036,0.017] [-0.020, 0.030] [-0.115, 0.034] 
<0.371> <0.462> <0.701> <0.187> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) 
0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.035 
(0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.028) 
[-0.006,0.009] [-0.024,0.016] [-0.028, 0.021] [-0.021, 0.091] 
<0.691> <0.682> <0.775> <0.216> 
Data MTF MTF YRBSS YRBSS 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 123,631 123,631 524,842 474,336 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.041 0.178 0.059 0.231 
ENDS Elasticity 0.053 -0.033 0.032 -0.093 
Cigarette Elasticity 0.112 -0.068 -0.177 0.455 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the 
individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. All YRBSS models include state fixed-
effects, year fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. 
Regressions are weighted, standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state level, 95% confidence intervals 





Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis, Adding One Period Lead  






ENDS Initiation Ever Use ENDS 
Current ENDS 
User 
ENDS Tax Lead (0, 1) -0.001 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.017 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.021) 
[-0.027,0.025] [-0.006,0.016] [-0.014,0.030] [-0.026,0.031] [-0.024, 0.059] 
<0.952> <0.364> <0.476> <0.856> <0.406> 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.020+ -0.012+ -0.005 -0.051*** -0.061** 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.021) 
[-0.041,0.001] [-0.026,0.002] [-0.031,0.021] [-0.074,-0.027] [-0.104, -0.018] 
<0.068> <0.098> <0.695> <0.000> <0.006> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.005 0.010+ -0.002 0.012 0.036 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.008) (0.024) 
[-0.021,0.011] [-0.000,0.020] [-0.029,0.024] [-0.004,0.029] [-0.012, 0.083] 
<0.540> <0.059> <0.853> <0.129> <0.136> 
Data MTF MTF MTF MTF YRBSS 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 126,306 126,306 66,124 85,541 538,992 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.152 0.038 0.104 0.287 0.213 
ENDS Elasticity -0.076 -0.185 -0.039 -0.143 -0.142 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.096 0.743 -0.070 0.130 0.501 
      





   
ENDS Tax Lead (0, 1) 0.002     
(0.009)     
[-0.016,0.019]     
<0.849>     
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.029*   
  
(0.014)     
[0.001,0.058]     
<0.043>     
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.003     
(0.007)     
[-0.017,0.012]     
<0.708>     
Data MTF     
Years 2014-2018     
N 86,486     
Dependent Variable Mean 0.192     
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ENDS Tax Lead (0, 1) -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.002 0.0005 0.0005 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) 
[-0.015,0.009] [-0.006,0.002] [-0.016,0.010] [-0.012, 0.021] [-0.011, 0.014] [-0.012, 0.013] [-0.019, 0.020] 
<0.646> <0.358> <0.643> <0.607> <0.794> <0.942> <0.960> 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.012* 0.006* 0.011+ 0.011 0.017 0.015 0.007 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) 
[0.001,0.023] [0.001,0.010] [-0.001,0.022] [-0.009, 0.031] [-0.006, 0.040] [-0.006, 0.035] [-0.021, 0.036] 
<0.029> <0.012> <0.066> <0.291> <0.145> <0.166> <0.612> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.010 -0.012 -0.009 -0.012 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) 
[-0.012,0.010] [-0.006,0.001] [-0.016,0.012] [-0.034, 0.013] [-0.038, 0.015] [-0.032, 0.015] [-0.045, 0.022] 
<0.855> <0.187> <0.787> <0.378> <0.372> <0.471> <0.492> 
Data MTF MTF MTF YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 2014-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 244,360 244,360 246,192 580,788 580,788 580,788 504,639 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.066 0.012 0.080 0.080 0.019 0.014 0.107 
ENDS Elasticity 0.115 0.314 0.083 0.053 0.356 0.420 0.032 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.046 -0.580 -0.068 -0.379 -1.833 -1.800 -0.324 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed 
in Table 2. All YRBSS models include state fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. 











































Figure 2b: Table 3 Heterogeneity Check, Box-Whisker Graphs for  







Figure 3a: Table 4 Heterogeneity Check, Box-Whisker Graphs for  



























































Appendix Table 1: Unweighted Descriptive Statistics, 2014-2019 (MTF); 2015-2019 (YRBSS) 
 MTF YRBSS 
 Overall Treated Non-Treated Overall Treated Non-Treated 
Outcomes       
Current ENDS User 0.146  0.144  0.147  0.213 0.208 0.214 
[N=126,306] [N=40,298] [N=86,008] [N=538,992] [N=126,637] [N=412,355] 
Frequent ENDS User 0.036  0.034  0.036  0.047 0.049 0.046 
[N=126,306] [N=40,298] [N=86,008] [N=538,992] [N=126,637] [N=412,355] 
Ever ENDS User 0.057  0.055  0.058  0.081 0.073 0.083 
Current Cigarette Smoker [N=244,360] [N=78,538] [N=165,822] [N=580,788] [N=135,993] [N=444,795] 
0.070  0.067  0.071  0.113 0.103 0.116 
Current Cigarette or Cigar Smoker [N=246,192] [N=79,112] [N=167,080] [N=580,788] [N=135,993] [N=444,795] 
0.195  0.198  0.194  - - - 
ENDS Perception of Harm Risk [N=86,486] [N=27,804] [N=58,682] - - - 
0.009  0.008  0.010  - - - 
Current Cigarette Smoker (smoked at 
least half a pack a day in the past month) 
[N=244,360] [N=78,538] [N=165,822] - - - 
0.004  0.004  0.004  - - - 
Current Cigarette Smoker (smoked at 
least a full pack a day in the past month) 
[N=244,360] [N=78,538] [N=165,822] - - - 
- - - 0.022 0.018 0.023 
Frequent Cigarette Smoker - - - [N=580,788] [N=135,993] [N=444,795] 
0.146  0.144  0.147  0.213 0.208 0.214 
ENDS Sources*       
Retail Source - - - 0.141 0.122 0.154 
- - - [N=55,902] [N=22,260] [N=33,642] 
Internet Source - - - 0.051 0.063 0.043 
- - - [N=55,902] [N=22,260] [N=33,642] 
Social Source - - - 0.671 0.681 0.665 
- - - [N=55,902] [N=22,260] [N=33,642] 
Other Source - - - 0.137 0.135 0.138 
- - - [N=55,902] [N=22,260] [N=33,642] 
 
      
Individual Covariates       
Female 0.473  0.475  0.473  0.509 0.511 0.508 
Age 15.555  15.606  15.530  15.822 15.722 15.852 
(1.716) (1.682) (1.730) (1.224) (1.208) (1.227) 
White, non-Hispanic 
0.475  0.417  0.503  0.542 0.497 0.556 
Black/African American, non-Hispanic 
0.117  0.093  0.129  0.135 0.202 0.114 
Hispanic/Latino 
0.187  0.246  0.159  0.185 0.180 0.186 
Other Races, non-Hispanic 
0.146  0.169  0.136  0.138 0.121 0.143 
Grade 9.924  10.028  9.875  10.375 10.354 10.381 
(1.619) (1.566) (1.642) (1.097) (1.091) (1.099) 
       
Policy/Economic Covariates       
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.167  0.519  - 0.057 0.247 - 
(0.489) (0.748) - (0.199) (0.352) - 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) 3.017  3.164  2.947  3.211 3.054 3.258 
42 
 
(1.404) (1.461) (1.370) (1.134) (0.696) (1.232) 
Beer Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.288  0.233  0.314  0.281 0.168 0.315 
(0.261) (0.157) (0.294) (0.253) (0.163) (0.265) 
Tobacco 21 Law 
0.154  0.279  0.095  
0.094 0.076 0.100 
ENDS Minimum Legal Sale Age 
0.879  0.919  0.860  
0.943 1.000 0.926 
Indoor Smoking Restrictions 
0.815  0.882  0.784  
0.886 0.961 0.863 
Indoor ENDS Restrictions 
0.247  0.408  0.170  
0.244 0.240 0.245 
Recreational Marijuana Laws 
0.130  0.194  0.100  
0.103 0.041 0.121 
Medical Marijuana Laws 
0.554  0.743  0.465  
0.794 0.860 0.774 
Vertical License Law 
0.961  0.974  0.954  0.988 0.994 0.986 
Unemployment Rate 4.795  5.187  4.610  4.223 4.302 4.199 
(1.511) (1.672) (1.391) (1.008) (0.462) (1.121) 
Poverty Rates 13.937  14.102  13.860  11.101 9.597 11.556 
(5.096) (4.884) (5.192) (3.061) (2.922) (2.955) 
          
N 254,516  81,823  172,693  600,877 139,509 461,368 
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) are reported. Since state/county-level information is available in 
the MTF data, policy/economic controls are at the county level except for beer taxes, vertical ID, and marijuana laws in 
which we only have state-level data. Since county information is not available in the national / state YRBSS, 
policy/economic controls are population-weighted state averages.  
 
* ENDS Sources are only for the years 2017-2019 and are conditional on an individual being a current ENDS user  
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(half pack a 
day) 
Current Cigarette 
or Cigar Use 
ENDS Tax Lead (0, 1) -0.003 0.004 0.008 0.000 0.019* -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.013) (0.005) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) 
[-0.030,0.024] [-0.007,0.015] [-0.013,0.030] [-0.026,0.027] [0.004,0.034] [-0.014,0.011] [-0.005,0.003] [-0.015,0.012] 
<0.819> <0.448> <0.45> <0.983> <0.014> <0.827> <0.599> <0.806> 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.020+ -0.012+ -0.005 -0.052*** 0.033* 0.013* 0.006** 0.011+ 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) 
 [-0.041,0.001] [-0.026,0.002] [-0.031,0.021] [-0.076,-0.027] [0.004,0.063] [0.002,0.023] [0.002,0.010] [-0.000,0.022] 
 <0.059> <0.092> <0.707> <0.000> <0.029> <0.02> <0.006> <0.052> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 
$) 
-0.005 0.010+ -0.002 0.012 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) 
[-0.021,0.011] [-0.000,0.020] [-0.029,0.025] [-0.004,0.028] [-0.015,0.015] [-0.013,0.011] [-0.006,0.001] [-0.016,0.012] 
<0.514> <0.058> <0.867> <0.131> <0.991> <0.877> <0.218> <0.805> 
Data MTF MTF MTF MTF MTF MTF MTF MTF 
N 126,306 126,306 66,124 85,541 86,486 244,360 244,360 246,192 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.152 0.038 0.104 0.287 0.192 0.066 0.012 0.080 
ENDS Elasticity -0.080 -0.190 -0.037 -0.146 0.060 0.119 0.324 0.086 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.101 0.744 -0.064 0.128 -0.001 -0.040 -0.566 -0.063 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. 




Appendix Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis, 2SLS IV Model 






ENDS Initiation Ever Use ENDS 
Current ENDS 
User 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.020 -0.014 -0.007 -0.050*** -0.070** 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.015) (0.012) (0.024) 
[-0.044,0.004] [-0.030,0.003] [-0.037,0.022] [-0.073,-0.027] [-0.117, -0.022] 
<0.103> <0.106> <0.619> <0> <0.004> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.005 0.009+ -0.004 0.012 0.040 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.013) (0.008) (0.026) 
[-0.022,0.012] [-0.001,0.019] [-0.029,0.022] [-0.005,0.028] [-0.012, 0.091] 
<0.598> <0.075> <0.783> <0.168> <0.130> 
Data MTF MTF MTF MTF YRBSS 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 126,306 126,306 66,124 85,541 538,992 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.152 0.038 0.104 0.287 0.213 
ENDS Elasticity -0.079 -0.214 -0.057 -0.142 -0.161 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.089 0.717 -0.100 0.122 0.551 
F-Statistic 15,837 15,837 18,300 23,132 25,451.45 
Hansen's J-Statistic (p-value) 0.006 0.009 0.328 0.013 0.313 
  




Retail Source Social Source Internet Source Other Source 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 
0.033* -0.070* 0.097* 0.018 -0.045* 
(0.014) (0.030) (0.043) (0.015) (0.021) 
[0.006,0.059] [-0.128, -0.011) [0.012, 0.181] [-0.011, 0.047] [-0.086, -0.004] 
<0.015> <0.020> <0.026> <0.220> <0.031> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) 
-0.004 0.076** -0.099* 0.006 0.016 
(0.007) (0.028) (0.047) (0.019) (0.020) 
[-0.017,0.009] [0.022, 0.130] [-0.191, -0.006] [-0.030, 0.043] [-0.024, 0.056] 
<0.531> <0.006> <0.036> <0.729> <0.438> 
Data MTF YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS 
Years 2014-2018 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 86,486 55,902 55,902 55,902 55,902 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.192 0.185 0.627 0.042 0.145 
F-Statistic 26,277 28,588.33 28,588.33 28,588.33 28,588.33 
Hansen's J-Statistic (p-value) 0.620 0.335 0.208 0.187 0.314 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls 
and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. All YRBSS models include state fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and each of 
the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. Regressions are weighted, standard errors are corrected 
























ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.012+ 0.006* 0.011 0.008 0.016 0.015 0.007 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) 
[-0.001,0.026] [0.001,0.010] [-0.002,0.024] [-0.018, 0.033] [-0.010, 0.043] [-0.010, 0.039] [-0.023, 0.038] 
<0.067> <0.012> <0.105> <0.559> <0.229> <0.242> <0.646> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009 -0.012 -0.009 -0.012 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) 
[-0.011,0.010] [-0.005,0.002] [-0.014,0.012] [-0.034, 0.015] [-0.038, 0.015] [-0.032, 0.015] [-0.044, 0.021] 
<0.939> <0.28> <0.847> <0.456> <0.384> <0.477> <0.491> 
Data MTF MTF MTF YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 2014-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 244,360 244,360 246,192 580,788 580,788 580,788 504,639 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.066 0.012 0.080 0.080 0.019 0.014 0.107 
ENDS Elasticity 0.116 0.313 0.085 0.038 0.342 0.418 0.032 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.019 -0.478 -0.048 -0.342 -1.823 -1.819 -0.325 
F-Statistic 16,360 16,360 16,360 22,607.02 22,607.02 22,607.02 12,968.18 
Hansen's J-Statistic (p-value) 0.202 0.038 0.391 0.294 0.539 0.331 0.626 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in 
Table 2. All YRBSS models include state fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. 




Appendix Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis, Add Cigar Tax Variables 






ENDS Initiation Ever Use ENDS 
Current ENDS 
User 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.006 -0.016* -0.026** -0.058*** -0.066* 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.030) 
[-0.025,0.012] [-0.030,-0.002] [-0.041,-0.010] [-0.083,-0.034] [-0.126, -0.005] 
<0.503> <0.024> <0.002> <0.000> <0.034> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.001 0.006 -0.015 0.007 0.046 
(0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.041) 
[-0.021,0.022] [-0.007,0.020] [-0.044,0.014] [-0.013,0.026] [-0.036, 0.128] 
<0.946> <0.338> <0.304> <0.499> <0.261> 
Data MTF MTF MTF MTF YRBSS 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 126,306 126,306 66,124 85,541 538,992 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.152 0.038 0.104 0.287 0.213 
ENDS Elasticity -0.024 -0.256 -0.193 -0.164 -0.151 








Retail Source Social Source Internet Source Other Source 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.044* -0.042 0.033 0.028** -0.020 
(0.017) (0.036) (0.031) (0.009) (0.018) 
[0.010,0.079] [-0.114, 0.029] [-0.030, 0.097] [0.010, 0.047] [-0.056, 0.017] 
<0.012> <0.241> <0.295> <0.003> <0.285> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.003 0.065+ -0.116** -0.013 0.065+ 
(0.008) (0.038) (0.042) (0.026) (0.032) 
[-0.014,0.019] [-0.012, 0.142] [-0.020, -0.031] [-0.065, 0.038] [-0.002, 0.132] 
<0.765> <0.096> <0.009> <0.602> <0.056> 
Data MTF YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS 
Years 2014-2018 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 86,486 55,902 55,902 55,902 55,902 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.192 0.185 0.627 0.042 0.145 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls 
and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. All YRBSS models include state fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and each of 
the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. Regressions are weighted, standard errors are corrected 
























ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.009 -0.004 -0.004 -0.010 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
[-0.012,0.007] [-0.004,0.008] [-0.010,0.008] [-0.033, 0.016] [-0.014, 0.006] [-0.015, 0.006] [-0.023, 0.004] 
<0.553> <0.535> <0.783> <0.471> <0.425> <0.416> <0.150> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.009 -0.004+ -0.008 -0.034 -0.041 -0.036 -0.044 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.009) (0.025) (0.029) (0.027) (0.038) 
[-0.022,0.004] [-0.008,0.000] [-0.026,0.010] [-0.085, 0.017] [-0.100, 0.018] [-0.090, 0.017] [-0.121, 0.033] 
<0.159> <0.052> <0.364> <0.191> <0.168> <0.178> <0.257> 
Data MTF MTF MTF YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 2014-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 244,360 244,360 246,192 580,788 580,788 580,788 504,639 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.066 0.012 0.080 0.080 0.019 0.014 0.107 
ENDS Elasticity -0.026 0.112 -0.010 -0.044 -0.085 -0.123 -0.042 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.409 -0.967 -0.307 -1.231 -6.327 -7.679 -1.233 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed 
in Table 2. All YRBSS models include state fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. 
Regressions are weighted, standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state level, 95% confidence intervals are shown in [ ] and p-values are shown in < >. 
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(half pack a 
day) 
Current Cigarette 
or Cigar Use 
ENDS Tax Lead (0, 1) -0.011 -0.009 -0.036** -0.058*** 0.036* -0.004 0.002 -0.002 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
[-0.028,0.006] [-0.025,0.007] [-0.060,-0.012] [-0.087,-0.028] [0.001,0.071] [-0.015,0.007] [-0.004,0.008] [-0.013,0.008] 
<0.186> <0.247> <0.005> <0> <0.045> <0.425> <0.526> <0.652> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 
$) 
-0.008 0.007 0.022 0.022+ 0.007 0.015** 0.000 0.011+ 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011) (0.017) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) 
[-0.030,0.015] [-0.008,0.023] [-0.006,0.050] [-0.000,0.044] [-0.027,0.040] [0.004,0.026] [-0.006,0.006] [-0.001,0.023] 
<0.504> <0.328> <0.118> <0.055> <0.696> <0.008> <0.919> <0.075> 
Data MTF MTF MTF MTF MTF MTF MTF MTF 
N 126,306 126,306 66,124 85,541 86,486 244,360 244,360 246,192 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.152 0.038 0.104 0.287 0.192 0.066 0.012 0.080 
ENDS Elasticity -0.044 -0.148 -0.270 -0.163 0.065 -0.040 0.111 -0.018 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.146 0.577 0.630 0.227 0.100 0.669 0.080 0.408 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. 




















(half pack a 
day) 
Current Cigarette 
or Cigar Use 
ENDS Tax Lead (0, 1) -0.020+ -0.013+ -0.009 -0.053*** 0.028* 0.013* 0.006** 0.011+ 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) 
[-0.041,0.000] [-0.027,0.002] [-0.037,0.018] [-0.073,-0.033] [0.001,0.054] [0.001,0.024] [0.002,0.010] [-0.001,0.023] 
<0.055> <0.086> <0.489> <0.000> <0.039> <0.037> <0.008> <0.071> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 
$) 
-0.005 0.008+ -0.003 0.014 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) 
[-0.021,0.012] [-0.001,0.018] [-0.028,0.022] [-0.003,0.030] [-0.016,0.011] [-0.011,0.009] [-0.005,0.001] [-0.014,0.011] 
<0.573> <0.081> <0.803> <0.100> <0.751> <0.869> <0.253> <0.817> 
Data MTF MTF MTF MTF MTF MTF MTF MTF 
N 130,183 130,183 68,213 87,833 89,508 252,117 252,117 254,020 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.151 0.038 0.104 0.287 0.192 0.066 0.012 0.080 
ENDS Elasticity -0.079 -0.198 -0.071 -0.149  0.117 0.324 0.084 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.089 0.656 -0.089 0.143  -0.038 -0.494 -0.055 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. 




Appendix Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis, Any Vaping for Years 2017+ 
 
Outcome Current ENDS User Regular ENDS User 










Data MTF MTF 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 
N 152,674 152,674 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.162 0.043 
ENDS Elasticity -0.081 -0.220 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.086 0.578 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the 
individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. Regressions are weighted, standard errors 





Appendix Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis, Marginal Effects from Probit Modeling 






ENDS Initiation Ever Use ENDS 
Current ENDS 
User 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.013 -0.008 0.002 -0.048*** -0.061*** 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.013) (0.010) (0.024) 
[-0.034,0.007] [-0.018,0.002] [-0.024,0.028] [-0.068,-0.028] [-0.108, -0.015] 
<0.195> <0.134> <0.887> <0.000> <0.010> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.008 0.005 -0.007 0.011 0.029 
(0.009) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008) (0.025) 
[-0.026,0.009] [-0.003,0.014] [-0.031,0.018] [-0.005,0.027] [-0.020, 0.079] 
<0.353> <0.228> <0.597> <0.175> <0.241> 
Data MTF MTF MTF MTF YRBSS 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 126,306 126,306 66,124 85,541 538,992 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.152 0.038 0.104 0.287 0.213 
ENDS Elasticity -0.053 -0.125 0.014 -0.137 -0.142 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.163 0.415 -0.186 0.114 0.412  
      




Retail Source Social Source Internet Source Other Source 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.026* -0.069* 0.099* 0.024 -0.034 
(0.013) (0.032) (0.045) (0.016) (0.022) 
[0.001,0.050] [-0.130, -0.007] [0.011, 0.187] [-0.007, 0.055] [-0.077, 0.008] 
<0.041> <0.030> <0.027> <0.122> <0.113> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.003 0.069* -0.103* -0.004 0.014 
(0.007) (0.029) (0.047) (0.020) (0.022) 
[-0.016,0.010] [0.012, 0.127] [-0.195, -0.009] [-0.043, 0.035] [-0.029, 0.057] 
<0.636> <0.018> <0.031> <0.841> <0.526> 
Data MTF YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS 
Years 2014-2018 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 86,486 55,902 55,902 55,902 55,902 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.192 0.185 0.627 0.042 0.145 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls 
and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. All YRBSS models include state fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and each of 
the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. Regressions are weighted, standard errors are corrected 

























ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.011 0.007** 0.009 -0.001 0.009 0.008 -0.007 
(0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) 
[-0.004,0.026] [0.002,0.012] [-0.006,0.024] [-0.020, 0.019] [-0.006, 0.024] [-0.005, 0.020] [-0.030, 0.017] 
<0.145> <0.006> <0.233> <0.956> <0.266> <0.235> <0.567> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.0005 0.001 -0.0004 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.013) 
[-0.009,0.014] [-0.006,0.002] [-0.013,0.016] [-0.017, 0.019] [-0.014, 0.013] [-0.010, 0.012] [-0.026, 0.025] 
<0.7> <0.326> <0.829> <0.924> <0.947> <0.836> <0.977> 
Data MTF MTF MTF YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 2014-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 244,360 244,360 246,192 580,788 580,788 580,788 504,639 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.066 0.012 0.080 0.080 0.019 0.014 0.107 
ENDS Elasticity 0.104 0.385 0.071 -0.003 0.179 0.221 -0.030 
Cigarette Elasticity 0.101 -0.508 0.058 0.032 -0.071 0.251 -0.011 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed 
in Table 2. All YRBSS models include state fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. 




Appendix Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis, Unweighted 






ENDS Initiation Ever Use ENDS 
Current ENDS 
User 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.016 -0.011 -0.012 -0.041** -0.064* 
(0.014) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.029) 
[-0.045,0.012] [-0.028,0.005] [-0.035,0.010] [-0.065,-0.016] [-0.123, -0.005] 
<0.247> <0.178> <0.28> <0.002> <0.033> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.005 0.030 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.032) 
[-0.021,0.013] [-0.004,0.015] [-0.016,0.015] [-0.008,0.017] [-0.035, 0.095] 
<0.645> <0.287> <0.911> <0.452> <0.361> 
Data MTF MTF MTF MTF YRBSS 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 126,306 126,306 66,124 85,541 538,992 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.146 0.036 0.099 0.282 0.213 
ENDS Elasticity -0.057 -0.168 -0.087 -0.103 -0.047 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.079 0.428 -0.027 0.052 0.451  
      
      




Retail Source Social Source Internet Source Other Source 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.019+ -0.012 -0.007 0.028* -0.009 
(0.011) (0.018) (0.034) (0.012) (0.024) 
[-0.003,0.042] [-0.049, 0.025] [-0.075, 0.061] [0.005, 0.052] [-0.057, 0.038] 
<0.093> <0.509> <0.834> <0.018> <0.699> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.002 0.043* -0.065+ 0.008 0.014 
(0.006) (0.018) (0.033) (0.013) (0.021) 
[-0.013,0.010] [0.007, 0.079] [-0.131, 0.001] [-0.017, 0.033] [-0.029, 0.057] 
<0.785> <0.020> <0.054> <0.529> <0.521> 
Data MTF YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS 
Years 2014-2018 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 86,486 55,902 55,902 55,902 55,902 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.195 0.123 0.680 0.063 0.135 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls 
and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. All YRBSS models include state fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and each 
of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the 

























ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.008* 0.005*** 0.010** -0.010 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.005 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.013) 
[0.001,0.016] [0.003,0.007] [0.003,0.017] [-0.027, 0.007] [-0.008, 0.006] [-0.006, 0.005] [-0.031, 0.021] 
<0.024> <0.000> <0.008> <0.258> <0.783> <0.898> <0.706> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.003 -0.003** -0.007 -0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.010 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.012) 
[-0.012,0.005] [-0.004,-0.001] [-0.016,0.003] [-0.018, 0.013] [-0.006, 0.008] [-0.004, 0.007] [-0.035, 0.015] 
<0.438> <0.003> <0.166> <0.749> <0.781> <0.593> <0.436> 
Data MTF MTF MTF YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 2014-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 244,360 244,360 246,192 580,788 580,788 580,788 504,639 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.057 0.009 0.070 0.082 0.022 0.016 0.115 
ENDS Elasticity 0.080 0.314 0.078 -0.018 -0.007 -0.003 -0.007 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.177 -0.852 -0.285 -0.098 0.145 0.300 -0.273 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed 
in Table 2. All YRBSS models include state fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. 

























ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.018* 0.011*** 0.018** -0.005 0.007 0.008 -0.008 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) 
[0.004,0.032] [0.005,0.016] [0.005,0.030] [-0.027, 0.017] [-0.009, 0.022] [-0.007, 0.022] [-0.030, 0.013] 
<0.013> <0.001> <0.007> <0.665> <0.388> <0.293> <0.438> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.009 -0.007** -0.009+ -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
[-0.019,0.002] [-0.011,-0.003] [-0.018,0.000] [-0.018, 0.013] [-0.017, 0.006] [-0.015, 0.007] [-0.016, 0.015] 
<0.101> <0.002> <0.060> <0.714> <0.335> <0.464> <0.928> 
Data MTF MTF MTF YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS 
N 369,764 369,764 371,596 880,750 880,750 880,750 755,063 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.0848 0.0162 0.0937 0.110 0.031 0.023 0.143 
ENDS Elasticity 0.0874 0.2969 0.0785 -0.010 0.051 0.077 -0.016 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.3001 -1.3026 -0.2797 -0.075 -0.521 -0.494 -0.014 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic 
covariates listed in Table 2. All YRBSS models include state fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic 
covariates listed in Table 2. Regressions are weighted, standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state level, 95% confidence intervals are shown in [ 
] and p-values are shown in < >. 
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Appendix Table 11: Sensitivity Analysis, Small Clusters Procedure (Wild Cluster Bootstrap) 






ENDS Initiation Ever Use ENDS 
Current ENDS 
User 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.019+ -0.013+ -0.008 -0.052* -0.071* 
[-0.06,0.024] [-0.041,0.013] [-0.116,0.049] [-0.077,-0.024] [-0.147, -0.014] 
<0.208> <0.226> <0.687> <0.014> <0.010> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.005 0.009+ -0.003 0.012 0.041 
[-0.025,0.016] [-0.002,0.026] [-0.032,0.053] [-0.005,0.034] [-0.025, 0.116] 
<0.585> <0.082> <0.931> <0.128> <0.280> 
Data MTF MTF MTF MTF YRBSS 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 126,306 126,306 66,124 85,541 538,992 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.152 0.038 0.104 0.287 0.213 
ENDS Elasticity -0.075 -0.212 -0.059 -0.146 -0.164 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.095 0.712 -0.097 0.127 0.568 
      
      




Retail Source Social Source Internet Source Other Source 
ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.029* -0.076+ 0.101+ 0.019 -0.044 
[-0.036,0.063] [-0.230, 0.017] [-0.030, 0.335] [-0.063, 0.060] [-0.108, 0.038] 
<0.331> <0.076> <0.094> <0.392> <0.144> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.003 0.086* -0.105+ 0.006 0.014 
[-0.018,0.021] [0.013, 0.306] [-0.037, 0.028] [-0.054, 0.107] [-0.077, 0.081] 
<0.679> <0.032> <0.070> <0.820> <0.628> 
Data MTF YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS 
Years 2014-2018 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 86,486 55,902 55,902 55,902 55,902 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.192 0.185 0.627 0.042 0.145 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls 
and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. All YRBSS models include state fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and each of 
the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. Regressions are weighted, 95% confidence intervals 

























ENDS Tax Rate (2019 $) 0.013* 0.006+ 0.012+ 0.008 0.016 0.014 0.007 
[0,0.052] [-0.002,0.024] [0,0.036] [-0.025, 0.054] [-0.020, 0.074] [-0.017, 0.068] [-0.029, 0.082] 
<0.046> <0.078> <0.058> <0.630> <0.418> <0.448> <0.702> 
Cigarette Tax Rate (2019 $) -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.010 -0.012 -0.008 -0.011 
[-0.023,0.014] [-0.007,0.004] [-0.029,0.011] [-0.064, 0.016] [-0.095, 0.018] [-0.053, 0.016] [-0.077, 0.026] 
<0.906> <0.299> <0.840> <0.548> <0.480> <0.552> <0.540> 
Data MTF MTF MTF YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS YRBSS 
Years 2014-2019 2014-2019 2014-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 2015-2019 
N 244,360 244,360 246,192 580,788 580,788 580,788 504,639 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.066 0.012 0.080 0.080 0.019 0.014 0.107 
ENDS Elasticity 0.123 0.341 0.089 0.041 0.336 0.412 0.031 
Cigarette Elasticity -0.032 -0.530 -0.056 -0.355 -1.792 -1.784 -0.321 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: All MTF models include tax jurisdiction fixed-effects, year-by-quarter fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed 
in Table 2. All YRBSS models include state fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and each of the individual controls and policy/economic covariates listed in Table 2. 




Online Data Appendix: 
MTF 
 
In general, MTF uses six different questionnaire forms to survey 12-th graders and four different 
forms to survey 8-th and 10-th graders. Identical forms are used for both 8-th and 10-th graders. To 
reduce burden on respondents, not all questions are included in every form. For the outcome 
variables that we study, only cigarette use (IRN 00780) exists in all forms. Sample sizes for the 
other outcome variables are thus smaller by construction. 
 
The MTF variables are coded as follows. 
 
• ENDS current and frequent use: Questions in MTF on youth use of ENDS have 
changed wordings over our study period, we thus use the following variables to 
collectively define youth use of ENDS: IRN33710, IRN33840, IRN34370, IRN35340, 
and IRN35160. In particular, we define youth as a current ENDS user if they used ENDS 
at least once in the past month and as a frequent ENDS user if they used ENDS in 20 or 
more days over the past 30 days. As a sensitivity analysis, starting in 2017 we also 
include questions IRN34260, IRN34290, IRN34320, IRN35190, and IRN35220 for any 
vaping, which could include THC and flavoring products. 
• ENDS initiation: We define youth ENDS initiation via the survey question (IRN33960), 
which asks, "When (if ever) did you FIRST do each of the following things? Don’t count 
anything you took because a doctor told you to. Try an ENDS, e-pen, etc." The answer 
responses are: "Grade 6 or below, Grade 7, Grade 8, Grade 9 (Freshman), Grade 10 
(Sophomore), Grade 11 (Junior), Grade 12 (Senior), and Never." We define the ENDS 
initiation variable as an indicator, setting it equal to one if the answer matches youth 
current grade at the time of survey and zero if youth answered never. All other answer 
responses are coded as missing. IRN33960 entered the survey starting in year 2015.  
• ENDS ever use: Like ENDS current and frequent use, we use the following variables to 
collectively define youth ever use of ENDS: IRN33830, IRN34230, IRN34240, 
IRN35140, and IRN35320. MTF included these questions starting in year 2015.  
• Perceived risk of regular ENDS use being greatly risky: The indicator is set to one if 
youth believe that an individual is at great risk of harming themselves (physically or in 
other ways) if they use ENDS regularly and zero otherwise. The indicator is set to 
missing when youth did not provide a response to the question. MTF included this 
question (IRN33670) from 2014 to 2018. The question is not available in year 2019. 
• Current and regular cigarette use: The relevant question (IRN 00780) asked is: “How 
frequently have you smoked cigarettes during the past 30 days?” Possible responses 
include: 1="Not at all," 2="Less than one cigarette per day," 3="One to five cigarettes per 
day," 4="About one-half pack per day," 5="About one pack per day," 6="About one and 
one-half packs per day," and 7="Two packs or more per day" We define youth as a 
current traditional cigarette user if he/she used traditional cigarettes at least once in the 
past month, and we also use a separate outcome for if he/she used at least one-half pack 
of traditional cigarettes per day in the past month. IRN 00780 exists in the MTF for all 




• Current Cigar or cigarette use: First, for the current cigar use variable we use three 
questions to collectively define this indicator: IRN33720, IRN33730, and IRN33740. 
Question wordings across the three variables are similar except that IRN33720 focuses on 
large cigars, IRN33730 focuses on flavored small cigars, and IRN33740 focuses on non-
flavored small cigars. The question wording is: “During the LAST 30 DAYS, on how 
many days (if any) have you . . . . . . smoked large (flavored small, or regular small) 
cigars?” Possible responses include: 1="None" 2="1-2" 3="3-5" 4="6-9" 5="10-19" 
6="20-30." Hence, we first create an indicator for each of the three cigar use types by 
setting it equal to 1 if youth used at least one day in the past month and 0 otherwise. 
Current cigar use is then the union of the three separate current cigar use indicators and is 
missing only if all three cigar variables are missing. Analogously, current cigar or 
cigarette use is the union of current cigar use and current cigarette use variables. Like the 
cigarette use variable, all cigar use variables exist in the MTF for all years that we study 
though only on some forms. 
 
YRBSS 
The ordering of the questions preceding and following the current e-cigarette use have been the 
same between 2017-2019. However, e-cigarettes source questions were only asked starting in 
2017. The prompt before the e-cigarette questions has changed marginally each year in a way 
that we believe signals to the youth that the question is specifically about nicotine vaping 
products, since the brand names are only for nicotine vapes.  
 
2015: The next two questions ask about electronic vapor products, such as blu, NJOY, or 
Starbuzz. Electronic vapor products include e-cigarettes, e-cigars, e-pipes, vape pipes, vaping 
pens, ehookahs, and hookah pens. 
 
2017: The next three questions ask about electronic vapor products, such as blu, NJOY, Vuse, 
MarkTen, Logic, Vapin Plus, eGo, and Halo. Electronic vapor products include ecigarettes, e-
cigars, e-pipes, vape pipes, vaping pens, e-hookahs, and hookah pens. 
 
2019: The next three questions ask about electronic vapor products, such as JUUL, Vuse, 
MarkTen, and blu. Electronic vapor products include e-cigarettes, vapes, vape pens, e-cigars, 
ehookahs, hookah pens, and mods. 
  
34. Have you ever used an electronic vapor product?  
A. Yes  
B. No  
 
35. During the past 30 days, on how many days did you use an electronic vapor product?  
A. 0 days  
B. 1 or 2 days  
C. 3 to 5 days  
D. 6 to 9 days  
E. 10 to 19 days  




G. All 30 days  
 
36. During the past 30 days, how did you usually get your electronic vapor products? (Select 
only one response.)  
A. I did not use any electronic vapor products during the past 30 days  
B. I got or bought them from a friend, family member, or someone else  
C. I bought them myself in a vape shop or tobacco shop  
D. I bought them myself in a convenience store, supermarket, discount store, or gas station  
E. I bought them myself at a mall or shopping center kiosk or stand  
F. I bought them myself on the Internet, such as from a product website, vape store website, or 
other website like eBay, Amazon, Facebook Marketplace, or Craigslist  
G. I took them from a store or another person  
H. I got them in some other way 
 
Policy and economic covariates 
The following policy and economic covariates are used, averaged across the first and second 
quarters of each year to match the data collection time-frames for both MTF and YRBSS 
surveys. Data is used at the county-level for MTF analyses, unless otherwise stated to be only 
available at the state level. Local data is population-weighted to the state level for all YRBSS 
analyses, given the lack of county geocodes in this data. 
• Tobacco laws: 
1. Standardized ENDS taxes per fluid mL, described in detail in Cotti et al. (2021).24 
2. Cigarette taxes are the federal cigarette excise tax ($1.01 over the study period) + 
state cigarette excise tax (from the CDC State System25) + local cigarette excise 
tax (from the American Non-Smokers Rights Foundation26). 
3. State-level little cigar taxes from the CDC State System.2 Only little cigar tax 
rates are used, since these are the products believed to be most commonly used by 
youth. If a state does not have a specific little cigar tax rate, then the regular cigar 
tax rate is used instead. States either use an ad valorem tax or an excise tax, and 
both variables are controlled separately. Additionally, some states cap the 
maximum dollar amount of the cigar tax, which is controlled for as well. 
4. ENDS minimum legal sales age laws, as obtained from Pesko and Currie 
(2019).27 
5. Percent of residents living in areas with a state or local tobacco 21 law, derived 
from state laws and local law information.28  
 
24 Cotti CD, Nesson ET, Pesko MP, Phillips S, Tefft N. Standardizing the Measurement of E-cigarette Taxes in the 
United States, 2010-2020. 2021. 
25 CDC State System. Available at: https://www.cdc.gov/statesystem/index.html (last accessed April 13th, 2021). 
26 American Non-Smokers Rights Foundation. ANRF Deliverables for GSU 2019-12-31 (Pesko).zip. Maggie 
Hopkins <Maggie.Hopkins@no-smoke.org> (last accessed January 31st, 2020).  
27 Pesko, Michael F., and Janet M. Currie. "E-cigarette minimum legal sale age laws and traditional cigarette use 
among rural pregnant teenagers." Journal of health economics 66 (2019): 71-90. 
28 Preventing Tobacco Addiction Foundation. US Communities with Tobacco21 Ordinances as of September 4, 




6. Indoor air laws: We follow prior work in generating a smoke-free air law index3 
based on American Non-Smokers Rights Foundation data on states and localities 
banning smoking in restaurants, bars, and private workplaces.5 Specifically, we 
use the percent of the population covered under these laws in each state, weighing 
laws applied to bars, restaurants, and private workplaces equally, and treating 
partial bans (e.g., separate smoking areas) with half the weight of a full ban. We 
use the same method to create a parallel vape-free air law index.  
• Laws affecting availability of tobacco substitutes/complements:  
1. The state’s beer tax,29  
2. Indicator for presence of a state vertical ID law for youth,30 
3. Indicators for state medical and recreational marijuana laws,31 and  
• Economic climate:32  
1. The unemployment rate, 
2. The percent of residents living below the poverty line. 
• For a sensitivity analysis, National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) urban-rural 




29 Urban Institute & Brookings Institution. State Alcohol Excise Taxes. Available at: 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/state-alcohol-excise-taxes (last accessed April 13th, 2021).  
30 Nesson, Erik, and Vinish Shrestha. "The effects of false identification laws on underage alcohol‐related traffic 
fatalities." Health Economics (2021). We supplemented data from this paper with newer dates: Minnesota (8/2018), 
Missouri (12/2012), New York (1/2013), Oregon (12/2018), and Tennessee (7/2018). 
31 Marijuana Policy Project. State Laws With Alternatives to Incarceration for Marijuana Possession. Available at: 
https://www.mpp.org/assets/pdf/issues/decriminalization/State-Decrim-Chart.pdf (last accessed April 13th, 2021). 
32 University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research. (2021, Feb.). UKCPR National Welfare Data, 1980-2019. 
Lexington, KY. Available at http://ukcpr.org/resources/national-welfare-data (last accessed April 13th, 2021). 
33 2013 NCHS Urban-Rural Classification Scheme for Counties. Available at: 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data_access/urban_rural.htm. (last accessed June 7th, 2021). 
